Teenagers, traffic tickets, and underage drinking in Illinois


In June, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the law requiring the secretary of state to suspend the driver’s licenses of underage drinkers is constitutional. Following the ruling in the consolidated case of People v. Zachary R. Boeckmann, et al., Traffic court judges must now suspend the license of underage drivers for three months if these teens have been fined for underage drinking.

The People v. Zachary (“Zachary”) is distinguished because the underage teenager does not have to receive a traffic ticket for driving under the influence of alcohol in order to have his license suspended. It is enough that the adolescent is found guilty of underage drinking. The defendants in the Zachary case pleaded guilty to the 2008 underage drinking charges, but appealed the constitutionality of 625 ILCS 5 / 6-206 (a) (43). They argued that this section violated their due process and equal protection rights because there was no connection between the suspension of their driver’s licenses and an underage drinking offense that does not involve a car or other motor vehicle.

Obviously, most of the Illinois Supreme Court justices thought differently. In a twelve-page opinion written by Judge Thomas L. Kilbride, the court stated: “It is reasonable to believe that a youth who violates the underage drinking law may also lack judgment to refuse to drive after to drink”. The court added that “preventing youth from driving after consuming alcohol undoubtedly promotes the public interest in the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles.”

Finding section 206 constitutional, the court discussed the matter of People v. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d 124 (1989) extensively. In Linder, the trial judge found section 206 unconstitutional. Lindner’s court held that revoking the defendant’s driving privileges based on his sex offense was a violation of his constitutional right to due process. Judge Kilbride argued that the defendants relied on an overly narrow interpretation of Lindner in their argument that a suspension or revocation of driving privileges is unconstitutional when no motor vehicle was involved in the crime. Judge Linder wrote “[t]Lindner’s rationale is broader than simply determining whether a vehicle was involved in the crime. Rather, the fundamental determination is whether the revocation of driving privileges is in the public interest in the safe operation of motor vehicles. “